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Insider trading is one of the results of asymmetric information. It not only 
damage the market order, cause a huge loss to the investor, but also distort the 
market price, destroy the resources allocation. Therefore the securities supervision 
departments in many countries take it as a kind of illegal act, and many stock 
markets introduce the legal system. The previous research found that legal 
protection of investor can’t always improve the efficiency of the insider trading 
regulation and the function of law variables is limited. Therefore, some scholars 
think that whether the media can do some help to the corporate governance and even 
insider trading regulations.  
This article chooses the listed company between 2004-2009 as research 
samples, and calculation insider trading regulation efficiency through the EKOP 
model, to find the impacts of legal protection of investor and the media supervision 
on insider trading regulation efficiency.  
The empirical result indicates that: (1) investor protection can effectively 
restrain the occurrence of insider trading behavior and improve the efficiency of 
insider trading regulation, (2) media attention can effectively restrain the occurrence 
of insider trading behavior, (3) in the strengthen of insider trading regulation, 
investors legal protection and the media supervision is alternative. So, in the areas of 
the investors legal protection is low, strengthen the media attention can effectively 
improve the supervision level.  
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易的非法收益来看，就 2010 年一年的内幕交易案件的平均非法收益达到 2500
多万，可见内幕交易的危害之大。同年，受到行政处罚的 10 件内幕交易案件中，
























易的不法行为依然普遍存在呢？以 La Porta 等为代表的西方学者引入了制度性
因素作为重要的解释变量，并在政策含义的提出中强调了投资者权利的法律保
护对公司治理与企业行为的重要作用（La Porta，1998，1999，2000，2002；
Levine，1990；Demieguc-Kunt 和 Mksimovic，1998；Fredsman 等，2003）。同
时已有文献也指出，内幕交易监管有效与否不仅取决于一系列相关法案的颁布
与实施，而且还需要投资者法律保护的整套机制做保障。许多研究表明，相对
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